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HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY. By Don Herzog. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1989. Pp. xv, 293. Cloth, $45; 
paper, $12.95. 
Introduction: Definitions and Foundations 
Don Herzog's1 Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory seeks 
to provide a historically and sociologically grounded account of con-
sent theory.2 Herzog defines consent theory as "any political, moral, 
legal, or social theory that casts society as a collection of free individu-
als and then seeks to explain or justify outcomes by appealing to their 
voluntary actions, especially choice and consent."3 Herzog describes 
his project in the preface: 
I want to pursue difficulties facing consent theorists - not from the 
outside, as a utilitarian or as a champion of some other view, but from 
the inside, as someone committed to consent. (The "critique" of my sub-
title, then, is in Kant's sense: an exploration of the problems and limits 
of consent theory, but also an account of its strengths and, in the end, a 
vindication more than a rejection.) [pp. ix-x] 
Herzog also explores and defends liberalism, a doctrine closely re-
lated to consent theory which holds that individuals should be free to 
pursue their own chosen values and goals so long as the pursuit of 
these goals and values is compatible with the rights and safety of other 
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan. Professor Herzog is the 
author of WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN PoLmCAL THEORY (1985); As Many As 
Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 609 (1987) (criticizing the way liber-
alism is characterized by members of the Critical Legal Studies movement); and Some Questions 
fer Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986). 
2. The literature on consent theory is voluminous. A good introductory discussion, with 
bibliography, is Weale, Consent, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 95 (D. Miller, J. Coleman, W. Connolly, A. Ryan eds. 1987); see also Pitkin, Obliga-
tion and Consent, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY (P. Laslett, w. Runciman & Q. Skin-
ner eds. 1972). 
3. P. 1. The book's title refers to a problem confronting consent theory: consent theory is 
formal in the sense that it stipulates the basis for obligations - consent - without setting forth 
substantive criteria for determining what obligations merit consent. Thus, if one consents to 
being a slave, consent theory does not provide the resources for criticizing that choice. Indeed, 
since consent theory validates the obligations and states of affairs to which the individual con-
sents, consent theory could, in principle, validate slavery. This is an embarrassment to consent 
theorists. Pp. 179-81. The happy slave is the slave who consents to enslavement. Herzog says 
that defenders of slavery in the antebellum south sometimes argued that their slaves were happy. 
P. ix. The veracity of this claim aside, the happy slave can serve as a hypothetical to be used in 
exploring consent theory: if we came upon a happy slave, would his happiness - his consenting 
to his condition - validate slavery? Is there a way, consistent with consent theory, to tell the 
happy slave that slavery is repugnant and that he should not be a slave? It is important to note 
that Herzog devotes only about fifteen pages to the problem of happy slaves. Pp. ix-xii, 59, 237-
47. He prefers to explore the implications of historical incidents and episodes, rather than reason 
from hypothetical examples. P. xii. 
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members of society. Government, according to most liberals, should 
be limited to protecting the security of citizens and promoting the con-
ditions necessary for the individual's pursuit of her chosen ends. 
Herzog provides a good description of the liberal state: 
The liberal state doesn't tell us how to lead our lives. It doesn't insist 
that we be devoted to any one religion; indeed it is indifferent to whether 
we're religious at all. It doesn't instruct us on the merits of competing 
life plans, on whether it's better to pursue fame, money, or a nondescript 
happiness. Provided we don't harm others, the liberal state allows us to 
pursue our proudest aspirations - or to bask mindlessly in cathode rays 
emanating from our television sets. It is silent on a host of issues. [p. 
148] 
Herzog also uses his accounts of consent theory and liberalism to 
argue for and illustrate a method of interpreting political theory that 
focuses on historical and sociological context. A political theory, in 
Herzog's view, is a historical artifact which emerges at a particular 
place and time in response to specific historical and sociological devel-
opments. The historical and sociological developments to which con-
sent theory and liberalism responded include the practices of politics 
and law in Tudor and Stuart England, the breakdown of a hierarchical 
traditional social order, and a preoccupation with the threat to tradi-
tional bases of social order presented by the phenomenon of the "mas-
terless man. "4 
Political theories, according to Herzog, are "maps" of social real-
ity - maps that are both descriptive and normative. These maps 
"both chart what actually goes on in the world and provide critical 
standards and ideals for appraising what happens" {p. 24). Herzog 
asserts that the impetus behind drawing and redrawing such maps is 
the realization that political beliefs and attitudes have become unsatis-
factory guides to understanding and evaluating the social and political 
world. 
Herzog calls his approach "sensible pragmatism" {pp. 22-23). 
Such an orientation focuses on political theories as responses to anom-
alies in existing webs of beliefs and practices. When beliefs about so-
cial order are rendered incoherent by social conditions or practices, 
revisions of political theories can be viewed as redrawings (either in 
whole or, more usually, in part) of the conceptual and theoretical 
"maps" of the social and political world. It is by use of such maps 
that people understand and evaluate the meaning of action and roles in 
the world. 
Based upon this understanding of political and social theory, 
4. "Masterless men," according to Herzog, were defined in seventeenth-century England as 
"all sorts of disorderly types not under the thumb of some authority." P. 45. Herzog points out 
that women too could be masterless and that the masterless, disobedient woman was viewed as a 
"source of disorder." P. 46. However, seventeenth-century writers refer only to "masterless 
men," so that is the locution Herzog adopts. 
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Herzog argues that consent theory arose in response to new social con-
ditions and to a new set of political practices. These new conditions 
and practices rendered previous conceptions of the social world based 
on such hierarchical models as the great chain of being5 unhelpful in 
interpreting relations and conduct in that world. Consent theory, ac-
cording to Herzog, was "posed as a superior alternative for under-
standing and appraising the social world" (p. 24). 
But consent theory, in turn, produced its own dilemmas because it 
mapped a world in which individuals chose their own obligations and 
roles. Such a world seemed utterly to lack any basis for social order, 
especially to the seventeenth-century mind that habitually thought in 
terms of structured hierarchies that bound all members of society in 
complex webs of deference and authority. What was needed was an 
explanation of how a society of unbound individuals - masterless 
men - who created their own obligations, and could therefore decline 
to create and observe such obligations, could be peaceful and orderly. 
In a world mapped by consent theory how could there be liberty with-
out license, freedom without anarchy? The solution, according to 
Herzog, was liberalism (pp. 161-62, 179-81). 
Liberalism, and the vision of society it advocated and depended 
upon, provided the basis for social order. Just how it did so Herzog 
does not make clear. Nor does he very thoroughly explore the interre-
lations among the key concepts he discusses ---consent theory, master-
less men, liberalism, and social differentiation. 6 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF HAPPY SLAVES 
Herzog begins the book with a methodological chapter in which he 
sets out his approach to political theory. He uses historical episodes 
from the English Civil War to discuss such issues as the relation of 
ideas to action (pp. 12-18), the interpretation of texts and the impor-
tance of authorial intent (pp. 25-27), the importance of pluralistic ap-
proaches to explanation in social theory (pp. 19-22), historicism (pp. 
22-33) (replete with quotes that illustrate historicist sensibilities from 
5. Pp. 40-42. Herzog explains the conception of the great chain of being: 
The whole cosmos is animated by order, an order conceived of as a unified hierarchy. A 
great chain of being connects everything: God, the angels, the ether, man, animals, plants, 
and so on. Everything in the cosmos has its rightful place and must defer to its superior; so 
too in human society, where individuals belong to orders or estates of a clearly demarcated 
hierarchy. Place and degree emerge as central categories in this view. 
P. 40. 
On the great chain of being and other hierarchical models of order, see A. LoVEJOY, THB 
GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THB HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1936); E. TILLYARD, THE 
ELIZABETHAN WORLD PICTURE (1943). 
6. "Social differentiation" refers to a society in which the individual may occupy a number 
of roles, each of which is treated, for many purposes, as distinct. In a socially differentiated 
society, institutions also maintain a degree of distinctness: each has different concerns and, often, 
different norms. Pp. 165-68. 
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figures as diverse as Shakespeare, Adam Smith, and E.P. Thompson), 
and frameworks of political thought available in Tudor and Stuart 
England (pp. 33-38). The chapter also includes an interesting digres-
sion about pretexts. 7 
In the second chapter, Herzog discusses the rise of masterless men8 
and explains the perception in Tudor and Stuart England that there 
were more of them roaming about than there had been before. While 
he does not say that the perception of increasing numbers of master-
less individuals was accurate (p. 40), he does argue that economic dis-
location associated with the enclosure movement, inflation, bad 
harvests, and an increase in population created large numbers of wage 
laborers and vagrants (pp. 48-49). He also shows why masterlessness 
was viewed as a problem: the prevailing social theories viewed society 
as a unified hierarchy in which each individual was understood to have 
a place in a structure of obedience and authority.9 Masterless men do 
not fit on this "map" of society. 
In Chapter 3, Herzog offers an interesting interpretation of Hob-
bes' political theory. Herzog views Hobbes as attempting to reconsti-
tute social order along hierarchical lines (p. 109). Herzog's reading of 
Hobbes is subtle and insightful. Hobbes, says Herzog, was responding 
to the rise of masterless men and asking how political order could be 
achieved if consent were the basis of authority and law. Hobbes saw 
"masterless men just as his predecessors always did: as a profound 
threat to order" (p. 80). 
The explanatory problem [that Hobbes faced]: how can a population of 
masterless men hold together as a society? If people aren't caught up in 
ascriptive roles, condemned by birth to social hierarchy, how can they 
cooperate and live together peacefully? The justificatory problem: why 
should these individuals go along with schemes imposed by authority? 
Why should they obey the law? Why should they keep their agree-
ments? Earlier societies entertained similar questions . . . . But the ques-
tions are transformed, they take on a special urgency, with the 
eradication of what one historian calls "the ties of dependence" that so 
obviously marked feudal society. [p. 79] 
Hobbes' solution, according to Herzog, was to redefine key apprai-
sive concepts, like justice, so that they could no longer be used for 
criticizing authority (pp. 104-05, 109). This authority would, Hobbes 
hoped, preside over a "unified hierarchy" (p. 109). 
Although the chapter on Hobbes is fascinating, Herzog does not 
always alert the reader to how the discussion bears on the central 
themes of the book. Herzog's failure to connect adequately and 
7. Pp. 15-18. The book is full of interesting digressions that, unfortunately, blur Herzog's 
arguments. 
8. See supra note 4. 
9. See supra note S. 
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clearly the book's various themes is a weakness that blunts the force of 
his argument. 
This failure appears again in Chapter 4, where Herzog discusses 
whether, and in what ways, law is political. This chapter shifts the 
book's focus to a discussion of liberalism and the kind of social order 
which liberalism promotes and presupposes. But the reader is not told 
how the interesting discussions of the rule of law and the relationship 
between law and politics bear upon consent and masterlessness. Nor 
is the reader given any transitions to aid her in moving from the em-
phasis on consent in the earlier chapters to the focus on liberalism and 
social differentiation in the middle chapters of the book. 
Herzog's focus on liberalism continues in Chapter 5, appropriately 
titled "Liberal Neutrality." This chapter features a perceptive reading 
of Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration. 10 Once again Herzog's skills 
as a subtle, perceptive, and sensitive interpreter of works of political 
theory shine forth. Herzog shows that when Locke seemed to describe 
the existing political and moral landscape he was really prescribing 
how it would be best for people to think about social roles and rules. 
According to Herzog, Locke's argument in the Letter can be viewed as 
an attempt to create a self-fulfilling prophecy: even though religious 
conflict had long been a source of political turmoil in England, if peo-
ple would only treat religion as essentially private, and thus politically 
inconsequential, it would become private and inconsequential (pp. 165-
66, 178). 
In this chapter Herzog indicates that liberalism and social differen-
tiation are related. Locke, according to Herzog, is trying to exploit 
and promote an emerging social differentiation (p. 168). In a socially 
differentiated society the individual occupies a number of roles. She 
may be a citizen, a member of a family, an employee, a member of a 
club, a worshipper at a church, and a student. These roles are sepa-
rate; they are differentiated. The institutions in which she plays these 
roles - the state, the family, the business enterprise, the club, the 
church, and the university - are separate also; each has its own 
norms, purposes, and jurisdiction over its members. In liberal society, 
Herzog says, the separateness of the roles and the distinctiveness of 
institutions should be maintained so ~hat an individual's occupation of 
one role will not affect her treatment in another role. Additiom1Jly, 
institutions should respect the boundaries of their authority. Thus, as 
Locke's Letter argues, government should not dictate religious beliefs, 
nor should it base its treatment of individuals upon their religious 
beliefs. 
Herzog does not specify who dictates these boundaries or how they 
should be defined. There are a variety of ways of establishing the juris-
10. J. LoCKE, A LETIER CoNCERNING TOLERATION (J. Tully ed. 1983). 
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dictional boundaries of institutional authority. History and traditional 
social practices are important, though perhaps rationally suspect, 
ways of doing so. One could also argue that such boundaries should 
be functionally defined. A functional approach would look to the 
functions of the institution and would argue that the scope of the insti-
tution's authority should be confined to the purposes for which it ex-
ists. This approach would, for instance, posit the function of 
government as regulating the public, or political, interactions of the 
community's members. Herzog seems to embrace such an approach 
(p. 167). 
The problem with the functional approach, however, is that it is 
question-begging because it defines the scope of an institution's au-
thority by reference to concepts - in this example the "public" or the 
"political" - that are themselves (at least in part) defined by reference 
to beliefs about the proper scope of institutional authority. Any defini-
tion of what is public, or political, is intimately tied to an understand-
ing of what is the proper reach of public, or political, authority - that 
is, the scope of governmental authority. The public things just are the 
things over which public authority - government - rightfully 
extends. 
Herzog is not troubled by the dilemmas posed by such founda-
tional issues. He believes that our definitions of institutions, authori-
ties, and practices are determined contextually. We can only evaluate 
and interpret them "from an internal stance" (p. 167). Thus he relies 
on "our" intuitions about the functions and scope of the authority of 
various institutions. I I His approach, then, is simply to insist that, for 
instance, government should not extend its authority over areas be-
yond its jurisdiction. These are perplexing issues. Perhaps Herzog 
should have dealt with them more directly and elaborately in Happy 
Slaves. 
In Chapter 6, Herzog argues that the legitimacy of government is a 
function of its responsiveness to the wishes of its citizens. "Given the 
conditions of modern society, I suggest, any plausible account of legiti-
macy and obligation must center on whether the state is for the most 
part responsive to the people" (p. 205). He also argues that the con-
sent of the governed "isn't central to consent theory at all" (p. 182). 
Chapter 7, the final chapt~r of Happy Slaves, deals with s~me con-
ceptual problems raised by consent theory. Herzog explores the limits 
of the theory as a map of social practices both in Tudor and Stuart 
England and in contemporary western society. The chapter considers 
how "obstacles to autonomy" (p. 220) limit the voluntariness of 
11. For Herzog's argument that we argue from within a set of social practices - as partici-
pants in those practices, see infra note 13. Herzog frequently relies upon characterizations of 
what "we" believe to justify his normative arguments. This is problematic. See infra text accom-
panying notes 13-15. 
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choice. These obstacles include societally imposed definitions of ap-
propriate conduct, limitations on options available to individuals (pp. 
225-32), and aspects of individual identity over which the individual 
has no control, such as, for instance, who her parents are, where and 
when she was born, and what her genetic makeup is (p. 234). Since 
consent theory explains moral obligations by specifying what the indi-
vidual has voluntarily chosen, these obstacles to voluntary choice, if 
inexorable, will compromise the usefulness of consent theory as a de-
scriptive map and normative guide. 
Herzog does not think that we should abandon consent theory, 
however, even if the individual's choices are often not wholly volun-
tary, but are, in part, the products of such things as the limited options 
she has, her genetic makeup, when and where she happened to be 
born, and her being socialized to believe and desire certain things. 
Herzog believes that we should be aware of these limits on voluntari-
ness and thus be aware that consent theory oversimplifies the norma-
tive world it maps. But he insists that despite these problems, consent 
theory does present a useful descriptive and normative guide to con-
temporary social life. "It is, on the whole, a reliable map, an admira-
ble guide" (p. 247). 
JI. UNCLEAR RELATIONSHIPS AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
Herzog does not adequately explain the relationships between the 
theories and the sociological phenomena that are the central themes of 
the book. While his argument that consent theory and liberalism 
emerged in response to seventeenth-century British politics and reli-
gious conflict, as well as newly emerging social actors and structures, 
is suggestive and illuminating, 12 it leaves the reader uncertain about a 
number of central issues. Specifically, Herzog does not explain (1) the 
relationship between the two sociological trends of masterless men and 
social differentiation, or (2) the relationship between liberalism and 
consent theory on the one hand and the sociological trends (masterless 
men and differentiation) on the other. 
These issues are important because the social world that Herzog 
describes as emerging in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a 
world of social differentiation inhabited by masterless people, is, at 
least with respect to those features, a world that we inhabit today. 
12. This view of liberalism as a response to political and religious discord is neither new nor 
especially controversial. See e.g., J. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION, 4-6 (1935); 
Stout, Virtue Among the Ruins: An Essay on Macintyre, in 26 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SYs-
TEMATISCHE TuEOLOGIE UNO RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE 256, 267-71 (1984). (A revised version 
of Stout's essay appears in J. STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND 
THEIR DISCONTENTS ch. 9 (1988).) Herzog's focus on emerging social actors (the masterless 
men, see supra note 4) and social structure (a socially differentiated society, see supra note 6), 
however, is important even if not completely novel. See e.g., Holmes, Aristippus in and out of 
Athens, 13 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 113 (1979). 
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Consent theory and liberalism are important ideological and theoreti-
cal features of the contemporary world; they are used to explain, jus-
tify, and criticize current political and social arrangements. Herzog's 
account, while suggesting a relationship between these issues, does not 
explain with sufficient clarity what that relationship is. 
A. Masterless Men and Social Differentiation 
How did the presence of masterless men in English society relate to 
the process of social differentiation? It is tempting, on a cursory read-
ing of Herzog's account, to conflate the two, and, historically, perhaps 
masterlessness and social differentiation were aspects of the same pro-
cess of social change (although Herzog does not establish this). But 
conceptually one does not necessarily imply the other, as Herzog him-
self notes (p. 179), and it is unclear how Herzog does view their 
relation. 
Herzog first discusses social differentiation in the context of his 
admirable analysis of the separation of law and politics (p. 112). "In a 
highly differentiated society," he explains, "each individual occupies a 
number of different roles." He notes that "the concerns of each role 
differ. . . . The norms for appropriate behavior in each role differ 
too ... " (p. 166). Institutions are also differentiated: they have "dis-
tinct identities" with "different concerns" as well as different "norms 
and resources" (p. 167). Differentiated societies are also marked by 
disapproval of what Herzog calls "leakage" across boundaries: "Indi-
viduals should be selectively forgetful in their different roles and at-
tend only to considerations that are contextually defined as relevant" 
(p. 166). 
However, Herzog does not explain the relationship between the 
presence of masterless people in society and social differentiation. It 
seems possible to conceive of a highly differentiated society in which 
people are not masterless, in which each separate institution is gov-
erned by a highly efficient authority whose jurisdiction extends over 
only that particular institution. Thus we might imagine a functionally 
federated society. In this society, the individual as a student would be 
subject to school authorities, as a religious believer to religious author-
ities, as an employee to her employer, as a family member to the ma-
triarch or patriarch, and as a citizen to her governors. The roles and 
institutions would be separate. Leakage would be nonexistent (if that 
is a necessary feature of social differentiation), but the individuals who 
constitute the society would not be masterless. Indeed; they would be 
subject to numerous masters. In such a society, custom and, perhaps, 
comity might maintain the jurisdictional boundaries separating and 
sustaining the different authorities. 
Such a society might not ever have existed, and Herzog might ar-
gue that such a society would be most unlikely ever to come into be-
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ing. Herzog might make such an argument, but he does not. He 
simply does not clarify the relation between masterlessness and social 
differentiation. Moreover, when he does briefly note the possibility of 
a differentiated, yet authoritarian social order like the one described 
here, his response is puzzling: "We wouldn't call such a world liberal, 
I take it. A liberal world must be, in part, a world of consent theory; 
the contingent but deep fact that the two grew up together is reflected 
in our ordinary usages" (p. 179). It is not clear what this means or 
how it responds to the problem. We have, therefore, an account of the 
emergence of consent theory and liberal theory that hinges on two 
sociological phenomena, the relationship between which remains 
obscure. 
B. Liberalism's Relationship to Social Differentiation 
Herzog's explanations of how consent theory relates to liberal the-
ory and how the theories relate to the sociological phenomena (mas-
terlessness and social differentiation) are puzzling because he does not 
attempt a sustained account of their connections with one another. It 
is clear that he thinks that they are related and that they are to be 
explained in terms of each other, but the reader is left to construct the 
explanations for herself. 
Although Herzog is not able to offer a precise explanation of the 
relationship between consent theory and liberal theory, he sees the 
need to try. As a result the reader can at least see the complexity of 
the relationship. Of the relationship between consent theory and liber-
alism Herzog writes: 
Liberalism provides an account of social order that makes consent the-
ory an attractive view of society, instead of a threat. It explains how 
masterless men can live together peacefully instead of toppling all social 
order. . . . Liberalism includes a focus on a particular set of familiar 
political practices, though of course it's an open question how those 
should be characterized and defended . . . . Consent theory includes 
purely descriptive projects in social theory . . . that aren't liberal in any 
straightforward sense. So the two are by no means coextensive. 
Still, there is a large area of overlap between the two. [p. 179] 
Herzog might have done more to explain how liberalism met the 
threat to social order posed by masterless people. The answer seems 
to be that liberal neutrality and role differentiation can keep some is-
sues, like religion, from becoming politicized. The liberalism that 
Herzog describes limits the reach of the government, and so restricts 
anyone's use of state power for certain kinds of ends. 
Liberalism and social differentiation, as Herzog describes them, 
also make one's activities in one role irrelevant to one's activities in 
another role. Thus my religion should be irrelevant to my business 
practices. This means that my customers' religions are also irrelevant, 
so I will not discriminate against any for religious reasons. This would 
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reduce social conflict. But it is not clear that this account of liberalism 
answers all the questions that were raised about a world of masterless 
men. For instance, why should the individual bind herself to any obli-
gations at all, and why should she honor the obligations to which she 
did bind herself? 
Herzog also does not thoroughly define the relationship between 
the theories and the social ·and historical phenomena that he discusses. 
When he does attempt some characterization of the relationship he is 
both pithy in the extreme and, seemingly, studiously vague. The 
reader is left uncertain about which, if any, of several imaginable ways 
of characterizing the relationships between the theories (liberalism and 
consent theory) and the sociological features (masterlessness and so-
cial differentiation) would gain Herzog's assent. Perhaps the theories 
and the sociological phenomena arise together, deeply and mutually 
implicated in the same social "logic." One category might come into 
being because of the other. For instance, the theories might arise to 
justify the social phenomena or to explain them, or perhaps as some 
sort of theoretical "reflex" of them. But Herzog does not do more 
than hint at his view of these possibilities. 
He claims that by showing the "deep connections" between liberal 
values like individuality, autonomy, and freedom on the one hand, and 
social differentiation on the other, and by "explaining how a studied 
liberal neutrality helps underwrite and protect that differentiation," one 
justifies social differentiation (p. 175; emphasis added). Yet it is un-
clear what Herzog means by to "underwrite and protect." 
In his narrative he notes that "role differentiation is at the heart of 
liberalism" (p. 147). He notes that Locke's views about social differen-
tiation were not yet descriptively accurate when Locke was writing, 
but that Locke and other liberals created a "self-fulfilling prophecy" 
(pp. 165-66, 178): by learning to think of the world as if it were so-
cially differentiated, people created a socially differentiated world. But 
Herzog's account also hints that social differentiation was not just a 
creation of liberal political theory: Locke, we are told, in "urging the 
merits of social differentiation" was "opportunistically extending a 
happy trend" (p. 168). This suggests an independent basis for the 
existence of social differentiation. Further, Herzog notes that in argu-
ing for social differentiation, liberals are upholding the social order 
"that makes [liberal] pursuits possible" (p. 180). Thus, Herzog is not 
suggesting simply that liberalism produced social differentiation. 
These are difficult issues. The analysis thus far shows that Herzog 
probably would reject both an argument that liberalism is concep-
tually and sociologically dependent upon social differentiation, and an 
argument that social differentiation is conceptually and sociologically 
dependent upon liberalism. In Happy Slaves, liberalism and social dif-
ferentiation appear to be in a complex relationship: rather than one 
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being dependent upon the other, they are co-dependent. Liberalism 
justifies the differentiated society, and it depends upon that society for 
its force. This may be what Herzog means to suggest when he states 
that "liberalism hangs on a certain account of social order," but he 
could be clearer (p. 180; emphasis added). 
Herzog is more illuminating about the relationship between con-
sent theory and masterless men. He argues that consent theory pro-
vides a way of conceptualizing social order in the wake of the 
increasing irrelevance of older hierarchical conceptions of social order 
- an irrelevance produced by increasing concern about masterless 
men (pp. 39-45). 
How consent theory relates to social differentiation, however, is 
unclear, in part because when Herzog discusses social differentiation 
he usually confines his discussion to liberalism. However, consent the-
ory obviously is needed to help "map" a society that promotes auton-
omy, freedom, and individuality, and that offers the individual "a 
range of significant options" - that is, a liberal, socially differentiated 
society (p. 173). Since such a society promotes choice, consent theory, 
which focuses on consent and choice, will be a useful explanatory 
guide. 
C. Explaining and Justifying Social Differentiation 
Part of the reason for the difficulty that Herzog has in establishing 
the relationship between social differentiation and consent theory is 
that the nature of social differentiation is itself unclear. His presenta-
tion suggests that social differentiation is more than just a descriptive 
sociological concept. His discussion implies that social differentiation 
has a logic which is normative and which suggests how society should 
be structured and how individuals should behave. This is consistent 
with his view that concepts and categories in social and political the-
ory may be both normative and descriptive (p. 24). 
"It's characteristic of such role differentiation that we not allow 
the concerns of one role to intrude on action within another role" (p. 
112). Herzog calls such intrusion "leakage," and repeatedly indicates 
that it should be proscribed (pp. 167-68, 172). It is not clear from 
Herzog's presentation where this moral judgment comes from. In 
other words, it is not clear how the fact of social differentiation (if it is 
a fact) implies the value judgment that leakages are bad. 
Herzog resorts to a number of strategies to try to bridge this gap in 
the presentation. One involves the claim that irrelevant factors should 
be forgotten or ignored in social action (p. 166). Thus Herzog asserts 
that leakage should not be permitted because leakage involves consid-
ering one of a person's roles to determine how to treat that individual 
when she is occupying another role. Herzog insists that a person's 
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other roles are irrelevant for considering what should be done to that 
person in any particular role (p. 166). 
This approach is problematic. The determination of what is rele-
vant involves a normative judgment that itself needs to be justified be-
cause irrelevant seems to mean "should not be taken into account." 
Thus Herzog is justifying a normative judgment against leakage with a 
normative judgment about relevance. All his strategy does is thrust 
our question about what justifies the normative judgment against leak-
age back one level: If leakage is bad because it involves the use of 
irrelevant considerations, we might ask what justifies the judgment 
that a given consideration is irrelevant? 
Herzog recognizes this problem and resorts to three strategies, the 
first two of which are functionally equivalent. He first argues that de-
terminations of relevance, and the judgments about leakage which are 
derived from these determinations, are "contextual" (p. 167); they are 
based on our interpretation of "our own social practices ... from an 
internal stance, committed to improving or even radically altering 
them" (p. 167). 
But this approach also raises questions. Where does this commit-
ment come from? What justifies it? What guides the judgments we 
make about what constitutes improvement? And what justifies our 
imposing the costs of these improvements on fellow participants in 
these social practices? Moreover, Herzog's argument appears to be 
somewhat circular: the social practice of assessing normative rele-
vance is being justified according to criteria specified by a web of social 
practices that contains the social practice under scrutiny.13 
Herzog's second strategy is to resort to intuitions that "we" (his 
audience) supposedly share (p. 168). He criticizes such appeals early 
in the book, noting that political theorists who make them often un-
derestimate the diversity of the audience for whom they write, and 
thus the likelihood that members of that audience will not share the 
beliefs the theorist says "we" have (p. xii). Nevertheless, Herzog re-
peatedly makes just such appeals. For example, when discussing the 
values of security and fairness, which Herzog says a liberal, nonpoliti-
cal legal system preserves, he writes, "[W]e are deeply committed to 
them, and it would take an interesting account to show us why we 
shouldn't be" (p. 134; emphasis added). On preventing leakage be-
13. Herzog might reply that although these beliefs are part of, and constituted by, a web of 
beliefs, we have no choice but to argue from within the context of some web of beliefs because 
criticisms of values and practices do not make sense unless there is some background "story" 
that gives the criticism of, and the proffered alternatives to, those values some "point." D. 
HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN POLIDCAL THEORY 231 (1985). On 
this view, perhaps, we can rationally examine a part of our web of beliefs, evaluating that part 
from the perspective of the entire web. See id. at 231-35. This response does not answer the 
other problems the text raises about contextual justification nor does it respond to questions 
about the identity of, and consensus among, the audience that supposedly shares the internal 
perspective to which Herzog appeals. See infra text accompanying note 14. 
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tween roles in a socially differentiated society, Herzog writes, "And 
again leakage generally ought to be resisted. We don't want the state 
to meddle in religion or army leaders to roll in the tanks and overturn 
political decisions or nepotism to strangle the market" (pp. 167-68; 
emphasis added). Finally, he says "We don't refuse Catholics political 
standing; we don't exclude metics and base merchants . . . " (p. 172; 
emphasis added). 
It is not that Herzog's views about what "we" believe are outland-
ish. Certainly, he sensibly notes that it would take an interesting argu-
ment to show that security, fairness, autonomy, liberty, and orderly 
dispute resolution (which liberal, socially differentiated arrangements 
supposedly secure) are not valuable (pp. 134, 173-75). But the resort 
to what "we" believe ignores the diversity of the audience. And more 
importantly, to invoke security, fairness, autonomy, liberty, and or-
derly dispute resolution as values that "we" share without defining 
what these values mean and entail is to ignore their complexity. What 
security, fairness, autonomy, liberty, and orderly dispute resolution 
mean is at least contingently contestable. And the trade-offs involved 
in obtaining these values are not as simplistic as Herzog's bland asser-
tions would indicate. I4 For while these values are obviously good, 
they are, until defined and elaborated upon, also empty. To defend a 
practice by merely invoking one or several of these values involves 
more rhetoric than argument. 
14. On the contestability of political concepts, see T. BALL, TRANSFORMING POLIDCAL DIS· 
COURSE: POLIDCAL THEORY AND CRmCAL CONCEPTUAL HISTORY 13-14 (1988); W. CON· 
NOLLY, TERMS OF PoLmCAL DISCOURSE (2d ed. 1983). 
Herzog is rather flippant in dealing with those who have qualms about the trade-offs involved 
in embracing liberal practices. For example, in the space of one page, he dispatches both Alas-
dair Macintyre (author of the widely discussed book, After Virtue) and Michael Sandel (author 
of an influential critique of John Rawls and contemporary liberalism, Liberalism and the Limits 
of Justice), both by the sovereign determination of the royal "we." P. 236. 
Herzog's description of Maclntyre's views is not very clear. He seems to say that Macintyre 
claims that moral agency is destroyed because the modern individual occupies numerous roles. 
Since she is not identified with a single role, the modern individual can distance herself from each 
of her roles. This, Macintyre argues, creates conflicts of duty that are not resolvable by any 
independent criteria. Lacking criteria for resolving these conflicting demands, the individual 
cannot make moral choices. All that is left for her to make are "l>lind commitments." P. 236. 
Herzog's answer to this argument is that some premodern individuals faced similar conflicts of 
duty and role. Additionally some modern individuals do not face such conflicts because they are 
confined to a single role. Modern individuals who are confined to a single role include inmates of 
jails and asylums. From this Herzog concludes, "But surely we don't want to say that only 
inmates of total institutions, of jails and asylums, are true moral agents .••• Hamlet's endless 
deliberations may be maudlin •.. but would we recognize him as a moral agent if he automati-
cally went ahead with the murder?" P. 236; emphasis added. So much for Macintyre. 
Sandel argues that the liberal conception of the self is impoverished and incorrect because 
liberals believe the individual is capable of taking a detached view of her goals and values, but, in 
reality, this is not possible because the individual self is constituted by its commitments. To this 
argument, Herzog blithely replies, "[W]e do want to secure for individuals the right to distance 
themselves however they can from their previous identities. More bluntly yet, we don't want 
courts to refuse to let, say, Amish adolescents depart from their communities on the grounds that 
they misunderstand their identities when they do." P. 236; emphasis added. This is not an 
argument. It is a series of assertions about what we believe. 
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It seems unsatisfactory to prescribe particular forms of social dif-
ferentiation and condemn leakage by invoking values "we" hold with-
out defining those values and subjecting them to a process of reasoned 
elaboration. Moreover, it is not clear why it is justifiable for "our" 
judgments against leakage to be predicated upon the fact (if it is a fact) 
that ours is a socially differentiated society. Finally, this approach suf-
fers from the same drawback as the contextual strategy: "we" who are 
making the judgments are constituted by the web of social practices 
that contain the social practices under scrutiny.15 
Herzog's third approach is to argue that strictures against leakage 
are characteristic of liberalism (p. 112). Thus, judgments about social 
differentiation, leakage, and what characteristics and roles should be 
taken into account in political, social, and legal decisionmaking are 
justified by their consonance with liberalism. This approach forces us 
to search for the justification of liberalism and then to assess what 
judgments liberalism, in turn, justifies. Since Herzog's account sug-
gests both that the weight given to liberal values (such as freedom, 
autonomy, and individuality (pp. 173-75)) and the way these values 
are defined may depend on the context of a socially differentiated soci-
ety (pp. 173-75), we have come full circle. Somehow social differentia-
tion, liberalism, and a set of values, which, arguably at least, are 
desirable, are mutually implicated. 
CONCLUSION 
Herzog does not resolve these questions. The book, however, 
would be valuable even if it only suggested them. Fortunately, the 
book does a good deal more. It contains interesting and illuminating 
discussions of political thinkers, historical episodes, and current con-
ceptual puzzles. 
Happy Slaves, however, would have been better if Herzog had 
more frequently explained to his reader the direction of his argument 
and how any given section relates to the broader themes of the book. 
Additionally, Herzog cannot resist digressing whenever the fancy 
strikes him. The book is loaded with side trips. These excursions are 
usually very interesting, but they interrupt the flow and argument of 
the book. The result is that the reader is like a traveler being led by a 
guide who wants to show him what is behind each tree in the forest. 
Ultimately the traveler becomes exhausted and frustrated; he can no 
longer remember where the main path is or where he is being led. 
This is unfortunate because whether or not the reader agrees with him, 
Herzog has a great deal to offer. He is a congenial tour guide, and for 
15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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the traveler less concerned with the destination and more concerned 
with the journey, the trip is worth ta1cing. 
- Adam C. Sloane 
